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Abstract—With the increase in Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
attacks capable of breaking Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
(HTTPS) over the past five years, researchers tasked with the
improvement of HTTPS must understand each attacks charac-
teristics. However with the large amount of attacks it is difficult
to discern attack differences, with out any existing classification
system capable of classifying these attacks. In this paper we
provide a framework for classifying and mitigating MITM attacks
on HTTPS communications. The identification and classification
of these attacks can be used to provide useful insight into what can
be done to improve the security of HTTPS communications. The
classification framework was used to create a taxonomy of MITM
attacks providing a visual representation of attack relationships,
and was designed to flexibly allow other areas of attack analysis
to be added. The classification framework was tested against a
testbed of MITM attacks, then further validated and evaluated
at the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation (IGCI) with
a forensic taxonomy extension, and forensic analysis tool.
Keywords—HTTPS, TLS, SSL, Man-in-the-Middle, taxonomy,
communications security, classification framework, cyber security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online transactions and communications are reliant on the
connection between client and server being secure. This has
led to HTTPS becoming synonymous with online security,
due to its simple layering of HTTP on top the older SSL
or the more recent TLS protocols. The HTTPS protocol is
stated to provide cryptographic strength to web servers and
corresponding web sites [1], with the latest version of TLS
standards also stating that it is designed to prevent eaves-
dropping, tampering, and message forgery [2]. However, the
HTTPS protocol, and consequently the SSL/TLS protocols,
have historically been compromised by many different types
of MITM attacks and have been subject to more recent
attacks as well. A survey of the most popular websites by the
cloud security and compliance company Qualys (April 2016)
found that 58.3% of websites have inadequate security and
support insecure versions of SSL/TLS [3]. Attackers can use
a MITM attack to decrypt secure communications leading to
the compromise of user credentials, private keys, and any other
encrypted data sent over the network. This is very concerning
as the widespread adoption of HTTPS as best practice for
securing websites, and having users becoming accustomed to
the use of HTTPS, may lead to a false sense of security. In
most cases, the client and server may never be aware that
their security has been compromised, and that an attacker has
complete control over the information crossing the network.
Therefore, it is important to understand the manner in which
these attacks are implemented and what can be done to mitigate
them.
The objective of this research project is to help improve
HTTPS and SSL/TLS protocols by providing an understanding
of MITM attacks against HTTPS. Providing an understanding
of MITM attacks can be accomplished by developing a clas-
sification framework that can be used to identify, analyse, and
classify MITM attacks into a taxonomy. Using this MITM
attack taxonomy, users will be able to quickly understand
how attacks are implemented and allow for faster mitigation
of new or existing MITM attacks. This will allow future
implementations of HTTPS and SSL/TLS protocols to become
more resilient to MITM attacks, by mitigating the identified
vulnerabilities associated with the attack implementations.
II. RELATED WORKS
The primary focus of this research project is MITM attacks
against the HTTPS protocol. The use of SSL/TLS within
HTTPS is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or
message forgery [4], [5], [6], [2]. However, historically there
have been several security issues with the layering of the
SSL/TLS protocols on top of HTTP to create HTTPS. In
1999, the authentication for HTTP was stated to be vulnerable
to MITM attacks where the attacker could eavesdrop on
communications between clients and servers [7]. This vulner-
ability was then carried over to HTTPS, which was rendered
insecure due to underlying HTTP authentication [8]. In both
of these scenarios, the attacker would be able to modify the
communications to support weak authentication, or remove au-
thentication entirely. A study conducted in 2005 suggested that
HTTPS provided little real protection against MITM attacks,
and that the actual insecurity of existing browsers was largely
due to the user’s interaction [9]. Since the introduction of
HTTPS, communications have become more secure with each
new version of SSL/TLS. This is largely due to the use of more
advanced encryption methods as best practice for websites
using HTTPS. A study of advanced encryption methods used in
web servers between February 2005 to November 2006 showed
a general positive trend in the adoption of strong key sizes.
It also showed that 85% of surveyed web servers supported
the insecure SSL 2.0 protocol [10]. In both of these studies,
the researchers identified that insecure protocols could allow
attackers to bypass advanced encryption methods using MITM
attacks. Although these studies are ten years old, flaws still
exist in current versions of the SSL/TLS protocols [11], [12],
used to implement a variety of MITM attacks [13], [14].
As can be seen in the Fig. 1, MITM attacks have pro-
gressively become more numerous over the past five years
with the majority of known MITM attacks occuring in 2014
and 2015. With such a large number of attacks occurring
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Fig. 1. Timeline of MITM attacks with Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures identifiers
relation to other MITM attacks is difficult without the use of
a classification system. There are several existing examples
when considering the classification or categorisation of cyber
attacks. However, the majority of related works tend to either
develop a classification system too broad to be useful in
the understanding of MITM attacks characteristics, or with a
overly specific focus on a particular system or cyber attack.
An example of an existing classification systems is the
computer and networks incidents taxonomy [15] which is
based of a taxonomy of computer and network attacks de-
veloped by the same researcher [16]. The incidents taxonomy
identifies attackers, tool, vulnerability, action, target, unautho-
rised result, and objectives as the main classification categories.
These taxonomies provides a good framework for incident or
attack classification, however they lack the depth needed to
understand the attacks. As an example of this is the vulnera-
bility category, which identifies design, implementation, and
configuration as possible attack classifications. These three
classifications are applicable to a majority of attacks however,
when classifying MITM attacks on HTTPS these vulnerabili-
ties are not helpful in identifying the actual vulnerable areas.
These taxonomies were later revised to update the classifica-
tions within the categories, including vulnerability [17], [18].
However these revisions were not significant enough to provide
a deep understanding of MITM attack characteristics. Other
generic taxonomies include a taxonomy of operational risk
[19], a taxonomy of network and computer attacks [20], and a
taxonomy of computer attacks with applications to wireless
networks [21]. Although these taxonomies provide a good
framework for classifying a variety of attacks they are limited
by their capability to identify specific attack characteristics.
Existing taxonomies that are capable of identifying specific
characteristics, include a taxonomy of computer worms [22],
Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks [23] and a taxonomy of
cyber attacks on Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
Systems [24]. However, these taxonomies are too narrow to be
used to classify MITM attacks unlike the generic taxonomies.
These related works, provide a basis upon which a classifica-
tion system can be developed to provide the necessary depth
needed to understand and adequately identify characteristic
differences in MITM attacks with relation to other MITM
attacks.
III. TAXONOMY OF MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACKS
A. Methodology
From the related works, it is apparent that current area of
cyber security research lacks a suitable MITM classification
system that can identify and classify MITM implementation
characteristics. The development of a classification system
specifically for MITM attacks would be sufficient, however
it would inherently suffer the same limitations as existing
classification systems. The issue with the majority of existing
classifications systems is that they either distinctly lack the
flexibility needed to classify a range of attacks, or lack the
depth needed to provide an understanding of MITM attack.
In order to address these issues the proposed classification
framework incorporates both broad and specific categories
of classification which are capable of being applied to a
range of attacks, including MITM attacks. This classification
system will provide the necessary depth and understanding of
MITM attack implementations against HTTPS, while allowing
categories to remain relatively flexible to accommodate other
attack types. The approach for developing a flexible classifica-
tion framework that can be applied to a range of cyber attacks,
including MITM attacks, requires that the classification system
be based upon common attack characteristics. The stages
required to develop this classification framework are outlined
as follows:
1) Research
• Identify historical issues with HTTPS
• Define MITM attacks
• Analysis of related works and existing tax-
onomies
2) Planning
• Define classification framework
• Gather list of MITM attack on HTTPS
3) Development
• Identify broad attack characteristics
• Identify specific MITM attack characteristics
• Define broad classifications
• Define specific classification
• Place categories in hierarchical order based on
implementation necessity
4) Testing
• Test classification framework with identified
MITM attacks
5) Validation and evaluation
• Classification framework extension
• Classification framework technical application
In the initial research stage, it is necessary to understand
the historical issues with HTTPS, before defining MITM
attacks and researching related works. Within this stage, the
idea for developing a classification framework was established
after the discovery that no existing classification system could
effectively classify MITM attacks. A planning stage is needed
to define the classification categories that will be developed in
the next stages. For this research project it was decided that
the developed classification framework would provide three
generic categories that can be used to classify any attack type,
while providing a single category that has MITM specific
classifications. In this case the specific category identifies the
vulnerability used to implement the MITM attack. Although
this single category will be developed specifically for MITM
attacks, it can easily incorporate identified vulnerabilities of
other attacks. As with the specific category, the three generic
categories can also be modified to incorporate future additions,
should new attacks require their expansion. Also in the plan-
ning stage, a list of current and historical MITM attacks should
be gathered and compiled from the related works, in order to
be used as test cases for the classification development and
refinement. In this research project the list of MITM attacks
presented in this classification framework and taxonomy were
assembled from a variety of sources, with the list being initially
gathered from a summary of known attacks on SSL/TLS [11],
[13]. These were then cross-referenced with lists found on
the Trustworthy Internet Movement website [3], and Com-
mon Vulnerabilities and Exposures website [25]. Additional
attacks were added through the process of extended research
into vulnerabilities that allow attackers to establish MITM
attacks. The development stage identifies attack characteristics
that define the broad and specific classifications that will be
used in the framework. These are then ranked in order of
attack implementation. After development, the classification
system can be tested with the identified MITM attacks, and
then validated and evaluated with an extension or technical
application.
B. Man-in-the-Middle Classification
In both historical and current MITM attacks, there are
several characteristics that can be identified. By identifying
these unique characteristics and analysing similarities between
a range of MITM attacks, a new four tiered classification
framework has been developed. These four tiers, namely; State,
Target, Behaviour, and Vulnerability, appear in the taxonomy
in hierarchical order of precedence. The order of precedence
was determined by prioritising the three broad tiers (State, Tar-
get & Behaviour) that are applicable to a range of cyber-attacks
over the MITM specific tier (Vulnerability). This was to ensure
that broader characteristics would appear first in the taxonomy
with each tier becoming progressively more specific to an
attack. As there is only one MITM specific tier, Vulnerability,
this is given the lowest priority. The remaining broad tiers
are prioritised based on key characteristics of MITM attack
implementations, resulting in the State tier having the highest
priority followed by, Target, and Behaviour. The summary of
the four tiered MITM classification framework is shown in
Fig. 2. The main benefit of this classification framework is its
flexibility, allowing each tier to be expanded or additional tiers
to be added when needed. It is important to note that each tier
of classification is designed so that the classifications within
the tiers are mutually exclusive. All currently identified MITM
attacks possess two common characteristics, Conditional and
Active. This has resulted in the MITM taxonomy seen in
Fig. 3 not having the Unconditional, Server, and Passive
classifications. These classifications are part of broad tiers of
classification which are applicable to a wide range of attacks,
and have been included for completion of the tiers and to avoid
future confusion.
C. Tier 1 State
The first tier of the classification framework is State, which
identifies if attacks have any conditions or prerequisites that
need to be met prior to the attack implementation. This tier
of classification specifically applies to the methods that an
attacker uses to launch an attack. There are two classifications
for this tier, Conditional and Unconditional.
1) Conditional: The Conditional classification is given to
attacks that require certain prerequisites or conditions to be met
prior to attack implementation. This classification specifically
applies to the requirements that an attacker cannot change
during an attack, and therefore must rely on these require-
ments being met prior to the attack implementation. In most
scenarios, this is due to an attacker not directly having the
ability to configure certain attack requirements.
2) Unconditional: The Unconditional classification is
given to attacks that do not possess any prerequisites or
conditions for attack implementation. These attacks are often
self-contained and can be implemented in most scenarios. In
cases where the attacker can resolve any attack requirements
and successfully implement the attack, the Unconditional
classification can be used.
D. Tier 2 Target
The second tier in the classification framework, Target,
identifies the target of a particular attack. In most cases, the
attacker will have a direct impact on the client or server,
which directly indicates the MITM attack target. However,
in scenarios where the attacker focuses on the sensitive in-
formation contained within an HTTPS connection, the target
of the attack is not directly indicated. In these situations, the
target is implied by identifying the source of the network traffic
containing the sensitive information that the attacker is focused
on obtaining. There are three different classifications for this
tier, Client, Server, or both Client & Server.
1) Client: The Client classification is given to attacks that
directly affect the client or any client side network traffic. In
scenarios where the attack implementation directly affects the
client or client side network traffic, and secondarily the server
or server side network traffic, the classification can be used
to reflect a bias towards the client. However, in most cases, it
























Fig. 2. Taxonomy classification summary
2) Server: The Server classification is given to attacks that
directly affect the server or any server side network traffic. In
scenarios where the attack implementation directly affects the
server or server side network traffic, and secondarily the client
or client side network traffic, the classification can be used to
reflect a bias towards the server. However, in most cases, it
should be classified as Client & Server.
3) Client & Server: The Client & Server classification is
given to attacks that directly affect both the client and server
side operations. This classification is also applicable to attacks
that have State requirements in both client and server, however
this is subject to how the attacks affect the client or server. In
cases where the attack implementation has a clear bias towards
a client or server, the attack can be given the classification
based on its bias, however in most cases it is best to use the
Client & Server classification to reflect that both sides are
affected.
E. Tier 3 Behaviour
The third tier of the classification framework is Behaviour,
which identifies the behavioural characteristics of MITM at-
tacks. This tier of classification specifically applies to the
methods used to launch an attack and the aggressiveness of
these methods during the attack. There are two classifications
for this tier, Active or Passive.
1) Active: The Active classification is given to attacks
that use aggressive methods for attack implementation and
execution. These attacks often require input from the attacker
to carryout the attack. Characteristics of an Active attack
include executing malicious code, altering connection settings,
or exploiting a vulnerability.
2) Passive: The Passive classification is given to attacks
that do not use aggressive methods for attack implementa-
tion and execution. These attacks are often furtive and do
not require the attacker’s input to carry out the attack once
implemented. Characteristics of a Passive attack include the
collection or observation of network traffic, and the analysis
of data patterns.
F. Tier 4 Vulnerability
The fourth tier of the classification framework is Vulnera-
bility, which identifies the vulnerabilities that attackers lever-
age to implement MITM attacks. This tier of classification,
unlike the previous tiers, contains the Undefined classification
which serves two purposes. The first purpose is to signify an
unidentified vulnerability and the second is to allow future
expansion. There are currently six classifications for this tier,
Cipher Block Chaining, Compression, Export Key, Implemen-
tation Error, Renegotiation and Undefined.
1) Cipher Block Chaining: This classification applies to
attacks that exploit block cipher encryption methods which
have Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) as a mode of operation.
Attackers can exploit inherent vulnerabilities in the CBC mode
of operation to decrypt the contents of an HTTPS message.
2) Compression: This classification applies to attacks that
exploit message compression. A key part of HTTPS commu-
nications is the compression of message contents to reduce
resource usage. Attackers can exploit message compression by
comparing size differences, allowing the inference of message
contents.
3) Export Key: This classification applies to attacks that
exploit export grade security keys. These keys were originally
introduced to comply with United States cryptography export
regulations [26], [27]. The regulations limited the strength of
cryptography software with the intention that the weaker export
keys could be broken by United States government agencies.
However, attackers are also able to exploit these export grade
security keys in order to attack the HTTPS communications
and decrypt the contents of the communications.
4) Implementation Error: This classification applies to
attacks that exploit an implementation error. These errors are
typically the result of a poorly applied security feature or a
bug in the system. Attackers can exploit these implementation
errors to launch attacks.
5) Renegotiation: This classification applies to attacks that
exploit the Renegotiation feature in HTTPS. Renegotiation
Attack NameTier 4 Vulnerability
Tier 3 































Fig. 3. Man-in-the-Middle Taxonomy of attacks
allows HTTPS connection parameters and keys to be changed
in existing connections upon request. Attackers can exploit
the Renegotiation feature to make their own connection and
then splice another connection to use the attackers’ connection
settings.
6) Undefined: This classification is used to signify a vul-
nerability that is not included in this classification, or has not
yet been identified. This classification is also a place holder
for future vulnerabilities that are discovered, and allows for
future expansion of the tier.
IV. VALIDATION AND OPEN ISSUES
A. Verification and Validation
The new MITM classification framework is verified and
validated with the development of the Forensic Taxonomy
Extension (FTE) and analysis tool ForensicTMO. The ex-
tension and tool are based on forensic requirements set out
by law enforcement at the INTERPOL Global Complex for
Innovation (IGCI), who provided essential input and feedback
during the development process. Through the processes of
developing the FTE, the flexibility of MITM classification
framework has been verified and validated. In addition, the
forensic analysis tool (ForensicTMO) is a tangible outcome,
that provides a proof of concept for the technical application
of the classification framework. The research and development
of the FTE and ForensicTMO were used to help address the
forensic and attribution themes, however the same process of
research and development could be applied to any number
of additional areas of interest. In this case, this benefits law
enforcement by providing a quick preliminary analysis of
cybercrime investigations. The combination of the FTE and
MITM classification framework during the development pro-
cess led to the creation of a high level cybercrime taxonomy,
which also verifies and validates the new MITM classification
framework. This high level cybercrime taxonomy shown in
Fig. 4, integrates the MITM classification framework into the
Type category of the FTE.
The cybercrime taxonomy is designed to provide the de-
tailed attack classification offered by the MITM framework to
all of the classifications that fall under the Type category. Each
colour in Fig. 4 is of significance. Orange is used to identify
the Man-in-the-Middle classification in the Type category,
and the fourth tier Vulnerability classifications: Cipher Block
Chaining, Compression, Export Key, Implementation Error,
and Renegotiation. This is to indicate that the fourth tier clas-
sifications are specifically applicable to the Man-in-the-Middle
classification found in the Type category. Further research is
needed to determine if any of the currently identified fourth
tier Vulnerabilty classifications are applicable to other attack
types. Grey classifications within the first, second and third
tiers of the MITM framework are designed to be applicable
to other attacks types within the Type category. As these
tiers are flexible, they allow for additions to be made when
necessary. These four tiers of classification are designed to be
mutually exclusive. The Undefined classification in the Type,
Vulnerability, Motive, and Offender categories are also grey
to depict they are not directly associated with a particular
attack type. This classification is used to signify a classification
which has not been included or identified in this category
and provides each category with the flexibility to allow future
classifications. The use of advanced blended and multilayer
attacks was not considered until the development of the FTE.
Although, it is uncommon for these advanced attacks to make
use of a MITM attack, it is not impossible. Conversely, the
Trojan, Worm, Virus, Adware, Ransomware, and Spyware at-
tack types will often be blended or layered. This can be largely
attributed to these attacks being representations of Malware or
malicious software, and are coloured green in Fig. 4. Similarly
to the green Malware attack types, the blue Phishing and
Spear Phishing attack types have been grouped together as
representations of Social Engineering. Yellow represents the
Denial-of-Service attack type.
B. Limitations and Open Issues
There are a few limitations and remaining open issues with
the MITM classification framework, FTE, and ForensicTMO,
as well as with the security of HTTPS and the current versions
of TLS. The open issues in relation to the security of HTTPS
and the current versions of the TLS protocol, include:
• Improper use of padding in the Cipher Block Chaining
mode of encryption,
• Reflected HTTPS requests inadvertently revealing
message contents,
• HTTP compression of messages inadvertently reveal-
ing message contents,
• Export keys and cross-protocol support in client and
server infrastructure,
• Insecure default security settings for server infrastruc-
ture, and
• Improper use of HTTPS renegotiation.
In addition, there are MITM attacks which are still cur-
rently viable on a small minority of servers due to the lack of
compliance with standards of best practice, and on clients that
are not using up-to-date software. Some of these MITM attacks
include the BEAST, CRIME, CCS Injection, and POODLE
attacks [3]. Taking all of this into consideration, the inherent
issues with the current ageing HTTPS protocol has become
more apparent with each new attack implementation. The
release of TLS 1.3, still in development, will hopefully rectify
or address some of these open issues [28].
There are also limitations with the MITM classification
framework, FTE and ForensicTMO. In order to use the current
MITM classification framework with advanced blended and
multilayer attacks, each attack needs to be individually classi-
fied. The FTE and ForensicTMO are limited in their analysis
of cybercrimes to the Type, Motive, and Offender categories.
This means that there are scenarios where the preliminary
analysis of a cybercrime returns all possible results. This is
an undesirable side-effect of providing an analysis based on
several historical cybercrimes, as these may have been carried
out using any combination of possible types, motives or of-
fenders. In order to reduce the selection, additional knowledge
of the cybercrime is required. This falls outside the current
capabilities of the FTE and ForensicTMO, and requires further
research and development.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has identified the increasing trend of MITM
attacks against HTTPS, and the lack of existing classification
systems. The development of a MITM classification framework
which provides the depth of knowledge needed to effectively
understand MITM attacks and the mitigation solutions for
these attacks, is the main contribution of this research. The
classification framework was validated and verified at the
IGCI. Direct interaction with law enforcement and under-
standing the challenges faced during cybercrime investigations,
provided the necessary motivation to extend the MITM classi-
fication framework to include areas of forensics and attribution.
As a result, the FTE was then further developed into a forensic
analysis tool called ForensicTMO, which provides a prelimi-
nary analysis of cybercrimes, giving an initial direction to a
cybercrime investigation. The evaluation of the MITM clas-
sification framework and the FTE, when integrated together,
allowed a high level cybercrime taxonomy to be developed.
This cybercrime taxonomy allows the user to understand attack
implementation details, while also providing broader forensic
aspects that could apply to these classified attacks. This proved
that the developed classification framework is flexible enough
to incorporate additions needed to provide an understanding
of an attack type and can be modified to meet the users’
































































Fig. 4. High level cybercrime taxonomy showing the integration of the MITM classification framework into the FTE
as a technical solution for law enforcement. This highlights
the value that this work adds to cybercrime investigations.
The limitations and remaining open issues, discussed above,
provide the basis for potential future areas of research and
development. A future enhancement of the MITM classifi-
cation framework would be to develop it into a tool that
can provide a visual taxonomy of the classified attacks. The
classification framework could be further developed to classify
the other attack types found in the FTE. These could then be
used to create a taxonomy for each attack type, when further
developing the high level cybercrime taxonomy. The classi-
fication framework could be tested with the remaining attack
types in the Type category. Finally, the FTE and ForensicTMO
could be improved by identifying certain patterns in the Type,
Motive, and Offender categories in relation to historical attacks.
This would allow law enforcement to identify similar patterns
in new attacks and potentially improve aspects of offender
attribution.
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